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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Core Ideas in Idealist Philosophy

Idealist philosophy, a dominant strand in Western metaphysics from George Berkeley's subjective idealism (*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710)—where "to be is to be perceived," reality as mind-dependent ideas—to G.W.F. Hegel's absolute idealism (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807)—history as dialectical unfolding of Geist (spirit/mind) toward freedom—posits that reality is fundamentally mental or spiritual, not material. Core ideas include the primacy of consciousness in constituting the world, the rejection of naive realism, and ethical imperatives arising from rational self-determination. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through the idealist lens, exemplifies a profound perceptual and dialectical failure: the judiciary's "order" constructs an illusory material "disruption," suppressing the mind's constitutive freedom and stalling spirit's historical realization, reducing justice to unperceived shadows.

#### 1. Berkeley's Subjective Idealism: "Disruption" as Unperceived Fiction in the Mind's Theater

Berkeley's idealism denies independent matter—objects exist as perceptions in a divine or finite mind; unperceived things lapse into non-being, emphasizing esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived).

The verdict fabricates "disruption" as unperceived fiction: presuming "high education implies discernment" perceives Chen's forwards (e.g., <100 retweets of Hayek critiques or the "Trump-kneeling Xi" cartoon) as mind-dependent "threats," yet evidentiary voids (prosecutor's unverified admission, zero causal chaos) render them non-perceived shadows—lapsing into Berkeleyan nothingness. The closed-door trial enforces perceptual monopoly: Chen's prison letter—perceptually vivid taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) and avalanche theory—exists only in the judiciary's selective mind, unperceived by public or dialectical scrutiny. Berkeley would decry this as perceptual tyranny: justice, as infinite Mind's harmony, demands universal esse—here, suppressed perceptions idealize coercion, inverting the theater of ideas into solitary illusion.

#### 2. Hegel's Absolute Idealism: Suppressed Inquiry as Stalled Dialectical Unfolding of Spirit

Hegel's idealism views history as Geist's dialectical self-realization: thesis-antithesis-synthesis toward freedom, where contradictions propel progress.

The sentence stalls this unfolding: Chen's inquiry—thesis of rational critique—meets antithesis in "disruptive order," yet the non-oral appeal suppresses synthesis, barring the prison letter's dialectical taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) and avalanche flux as Geist's advance. Selective enforcement (millions unpunished) exposes the stall: contradictions (evidentiary voids) demand Aufhebung (sublation), not fiat. Hegel would lament this as historical regression: the "high education" presumption abstracts Geist into static "discernment," denying freedom's realization—justice as Geist's self-legislation yields to arbitrary will. The case's opacity fractures dialectics: unperceived synthesis festers, inverting progress into regressive shadow-play.

#### 3. Rational Self-Determination and Moral Autonomy: Coercive "Justice" as Heteronomous Denial of the Ideal

Idealism's ethics, from Kant's influence on Hegel, demands autonomy—self-legislation through reason—as the ground of moral freedom.

The "shut up" directive heteronomously denies this: Chen's letter—autonomous synthesis of moral inquiry—legislates freedom through reflective taxonomy, yet external fiat ("upper-level instructions") subordinates reason to command. Berkeleyan perception reinforces the denial: unperceived by trial's mind, autonomy lapses into non-being. Idealists would indict this as moral void: justice, as rational kingdom of ends, demands self-determining dialogue—here, coercion's shadow eclipses the ideal.

#### Conclusion: The Idealist Lens on the Case—Perceptual Shadows Stalling Dialectical Light

From idealist metaphysics, the Chen Jingyuan case is perceptual and dialectical shadow: unperceived fictions deny esse, stalled Geist fractures freedom, heteronomy corrupts autonomy. As of October 25, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen's account remains dormant, its quiet an idealist vigil for light. This case cautions: without mind's constitutive harmony, reality fragments. As Hegel dialectized, "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk"—may dawn yet realize the absolute.