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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Core Ideas in Military School Philosophy from the Hundred Schools of Thought

The Military School (Bingjia), one of the “Hundred Schools of Thought” (Zhuzi Baijia) in ancient China, is epitomized by Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (c. 5th century BCE) and Sun Bin’s Sun Bin’s Art of War, focusing on strategic mastery for victory with minimal conflict. Core ideas include knowing oneself and the enemy (zhi ji zhi bi), adapting to terrain and timing (shi di quan shi), deception as supreme art (wei zhan zhi dao), intelligence and spies (qing bao), and supreme excellence in subduing the enemy without battle (bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing). Bingjia views governance as warfare: the state must maneuver with cunning, avoid wasteful attrition, and secure objectives through superior strategy. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through the Bingjia lens, exemplifies strategic blunders: the judiciary, as “commander,” misreads intelligence, deploys blunt force over deception, and fights needless battles, risking self-defeat in the “war” for order.

1. Knowing Oneself and the Enemy: Evidentiary Ignorance as Fatal Strategic Blindness

Sun Tzu’s dictum—“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles” (The Art of War, Ch. 3)—stresses intelligence as the foundation of victory; ignorance invites defeat.

The prosecution’s unverified posts and “evidence chain” betray this: without fact-checks or causal analysis (e.g., zero societal “disorder” from <100 retweets), the judiciary “knows neither enemy nor self”—misjudging Chen’s scholarly forwards (e.g., Hayek critiques) as threats, while ignoring self-vulnerabilities like selective enforcement (millions of similar shares unpunished). The closed-door trial and “shut up” directive compound blindness: Chen’s prison letter (rumor taxonomy and avalanche theory) offers enemy intel—non-linear inquiry, not malice—yet is dismissed. Bingjia would decry this as suicidal: a commander blind to terrain (digital context) fights shadows, wasting resources on a needless skirmish, as Sun Bin warned: “The wise general knows when to advance and retreat.”

2. Deception and Maneuver: Rigid Coercion Over Cunning Adaptation to Terrain

Deception (wei) and maneuver (bian) are supreme: “All warfare is based on deception” (The Art of War, Ch. 1); adapt to terrain, avoiding direct clashes for indirect victory.

The verdict’s blunt “high education implies discernment” is anti-deceptive rigidity: no maneuver around anomalies (prosecutor’s admission of unverified claims), charging headlong into a fortified position—Chen’s analytical defense (CAP theorem indeterminacy)—without flanking (public scrutiny or balanced weighing). The non-oral appeal and barred testimony forego cunning: instead of deceptive feints (e.g., fact-checks to expose “rumors”), it deploys crude force, echoing Sun Tzu’s folly: “To a surrounded enemy, you must leave a way of retreat.” This terrain misread—treating intellectual “quarrels” as battlefield frontal assault—squanders maneuverability, turning a winnable “peace” (non-punitive inquiry) into attritional loss.

3. Supreme Excellence Without Battle: Punitive Overkill as Wasteful Attrition

Sun Tzu’s pinnacle is “to subdue the enemy without fighting” (The Art of War, Ch. 3): victory through strategy preserves resources, avoiding the costs of prolonged conflict.

The 20-month sentence embodies wasteful attrition: no “battle” ensued from Chen’s forwards (zero ripple), yet the state expends resources on imprisonment, ignoring excellence—subduing “disorder” via education or verification. The “upper-level instructions” prioritize show over strategy, as Sun Bin critiqued: “The excellent general wins without fighting; the mediocre fights and wins.” Anomalies like evidentiary voids expose this: a non-battle victory—public clarification—would suffice, but punitive overkill drains the state’s “treasury,” breeding resentment among the educated, contrary to Bingjia’s efficient conquest.

Conclusion: The Bingjia Lens on the Case—Strategic Blunders in a Needless Skirmish

From the Military School’s strategic realism in the Hundred Schools, the Chen Jingyuan case is a commander’s folly: ignorant of enemy and self, rigid in maneuver, and attritional in a bloodless field, squandering victory for pyrrhic “order.” As of October 22, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a Sun Tzu-like feint. This case cautions: true generals subdue without clash—blunder, and the Dao of war turns against you. As Sun Tzu concluded, “In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity”—may the state seize it.