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Analysis and Commentary on the Chen Jingyuan Case through Avishai Margalit’s Core Ideas in the Philosophy of a Decent Society

中文部分 / Chinese Section

引言

Avishai Margalit在其著作《The Decent Society》（《正派社会》）中，提出“正派社会”（decent society）的核心概念：一个社会若要被视为“正派”，其制度（institutions）不得制度化地羞辱（humiliate）其成员。正派社会不同于“道德社会”（moral society），后者要求积极追求正义，而前者仅需避免羞辱，确保人性尊严（dignity）不被系统性贬低。本文试用Margalit的核心思想——羞辱的制度性、尊严的保护、预防不公优于促进正义——分析陈京元“寻衅滋事罪”案。该案中，司法过程涉嫌刑讯逼供、不公开审理、证据捏造等，凸显制度对公民的羞辱，违背正派社会原则。

核心思想应用分析

  1. 制度化羞辱的体现：Margalit强调，羞辱源于制度而非个人行为，如官僚主义或惩罚系统中的贬低。在本案中，昆明司法机关的“零证据启动”（无证破门、24小时审讯室关押、殴打取密码）构成制度性羞辱。判决书以“高学历=明知虚假”推定罪行，剥夺陈京元自辩权（“闭嘴！回答是或不是”），这不是司法公正，而是系统性贬低其学者身份和人性尊严。X账号@_cenjoy被“示众”作为“作案工具”，进一步制度化其耻辱，类似于Margalit所述的“福利国家”中对弱势者的官僚羞辱。

  2. 尊严与预防不公：Margalit认为，正派社会优先预防不公（injustice），而非抽象正义。本案证据链虚假（缓存图片作“铁证”、无“严重混乱”实证），违反《刑诉法》第12条无罪推定，却以“上层指示置于死地”为由强判1年8个月。这非预防社会危害，而是制度性不公，摧毁陈京元作为独立学者的尊严。其《狱中血书》控告“司法黑帮”，反映了对制度信任的崩解，正如Margalit警告：羞辱破坏社会凝聚力，导致更大不稳定。

  3. 道德社会 vs. 正派社会的张力：中国宣称“全面依法治国”似道德社会追求，但本案司法实践（如选择性执法，原创者未追责）暴露为非正派：它允许制度羞辱异见者，而非平等保护。Margalit的“记忆与妥协”概念在此适用——陈京元案若无历史反思（如类似张展案），将延续羞辱循环，阻碍社会妥协。

评论

本案是Margalit理论的负面范例：司法作为核心制度，若制度化羞辱，将使整个社会非正派。陈京元的遭遇——从Twitter转发公开帖文到牢狱自辩——揭示中国网络言论空间的“寒蝉效应”，制度优先“维稳”而非尊严。积极而言，此案可激发改革：借鉴Margalit，推动司法“去羞辱化”，如强化辩护权、证据审查，确保预防不公。否则，正派社会将成空谈，损害国家合法性。

结论

Margalit的思想提醒：正派社会非乌托邦，而是制度自律的底线。本案呼吁中国司法从羞辱转向尊严，重建公民信任，方能实现真正“以人为本”的法治。

English Section

Introduction

In his book The Decent Society, Avishai Margalit proposes the core concept of a “decent society”: a society that does not institutionally humiliate its members. A decent society differs from a “moral society,” which actively pursues justice; the former merely requires avoiding humiliation to ensure human dignity is not systematically degraded. This analysis applies Margalit’s key ideas—systemic humiliation, protection of dignity, and prioritizing the prevention of injustice over the promotion of justice—to the Chen Jingyuan “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” case. In this case, the judicial process allegedly involved torture for confessions, closed-door trials, and fabricated evidence, highlighting institutional humiliation of citizens and violating the principles of a decent society.

Application Analysis of Core Ideas

  1. Manifestation of Institutional Humiliation: Margalit stresses that humiliation arises from institutions rather than individuals, such as in bureaucracy or punitive systems. In this case, the Kunming judicial authorities’ “zero-evidence initiation” (warrantless door-breaking, 24-hour detention in an interrogation room, and beatings to extract passwords) constitutes systemic humiliation. The verdict’s presumption of guilt based on “high education = knowledge of falsehood” and denial of Chen Jingyuan’s right to self-defense (“Shut up! Answer yes or no”) is not judicial fairness but systematic degradation of his scholarly identity and human dignity. The X account @_cenjoy being displayed as a “tool of crime” further institutionalizes his shame, akin to Margalit’s discussion of bureaucratic humiliation of the vulnerable in welfare states.

  2. Dignity and Prevention of Injustice: Margalit argues that a decent society prioritizes preventing injustice over abstract justice. The case’s fabricated evidence chain (browser cache images as “ironclad proof,” no evidence of “serious disorder”) violates Article 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law on presumption of innocence, yet imposes a 1-year-8-month sentence under “upper-level instructions to put him to death.” This is not preventing social harm but institutional injustice, eroding Chen Jingyuan’s dignity as an independent scholar. His Prison Blood Letter accusing a “judicial mafia” reflects the collapse of institutional trust, as Margalit warns: humiliation undermines social cohesion, leading to greater instability.

  3. Tension between Moral and Decent Societies: China claims a “comprehensive rule of law” akin to a moral society, but the case’s judicial practice (selective enforcement, original posters unpunished) reveals it as indecent: it permits institutional humiliation of dissenters rather than equal protection. Margalit’s concept of “memory and compromise” applies here—if cases like Chen Jingyuan’s lack historical reflection (e.g., similar to Zhang Zhan’s case), the cycle of humiliation persists, hindering societal compromise.

Commentary

This case serves as a negative exemplar of Margalit’s theory: when the judiciary, as a core institution, institutionalizes humiliation, the entire society becomes indecent. Chen Jingyuan’s ordeal—from retweeting public posts on Twitter to prison self-defense—exposes the “chilling effect” in China’s online speech space, where institutions prioritize “stability maintenance” over dignity. Positively, the case can inspire reform: drawing from Margalit, advocate for “de-humiliation” in the judiciary, such as strengthening defense rights and evidence scrutiny to ensure prevention of injustice. Otherwise, a decent society remains rhetoric, damaging national legitimacy.

Conclusion

Margalit’s ideas remind us: a decent society is not utopian but a baseline of institutional self-restraint. This case calls for China’s judiciary to shift from humiliation to dignity, rebuilding citizen trust to achieve truly “people-centered” rule of law.