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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Aristotle’s Philosophical Core Ideas

Aristotle (384-322 BCE), the polymath architect of Western thought, developed a philosophy grounded in empirical observation and teleological purpose (telos), as seen in Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric. His core ideas include the doctrine of the mean (mesotēs)—virtue as a balanced midpoint between excess and deficiency; practical wisdom (phronesis) as deliberative excellence guiding ethical action; justice (dikaiosynē) as both distributive (proportional equality) and corrective (rectifying wrongs); the polis (city-state) as the telos of human flourishing (eudaimonia), where law serves virtue over mere power; and rhetoric as the art of persuasion through ethos (character), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic). Aristotle championed rule of law tempered by equity (epieikeia) to prevent rigid injustice. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Aristotle’s lens, exemplifies a tragic deviation from the mean: judicial excess in punishment lacks phronesis, perverting corrective justice into disproportionate coercion, undermining the polis’s ethical telos and rhetorical balance.

1. The Doctrine of the Mean and Excess in Punishment: Judicial Rigidity as Vicious Extremity

Aristotle’s ethics posits virtue as the golden mean—courage between cowardice and rashness (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b)—with justice requiring proportionality to avoid excess or deficiency.

Article 293’s application veers to vicious excess: sentencing Chen for low-impact inquiry (e.g., Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) presumes “disruptive” extremity without measured deficiency—no causal harm (zero ripple from <100 retweets), yet 20 months’ penalty tips the scale. The closed-door trial and “shut up” directive amplify imbalance: no equitable tempering (epieikeia), as Aristotle advocated for law’s rigidity (Politics 1287a). The prosecutor’s unverified admission signals deficiency—evidence lacking—yet excess prevails, corrupting corrective justice into punitive overreach. Aristotle would diagnose this as ethical vice: without the mean, “order” becomes tyrannical rashness, eroding the polis’s virtuous equilibrium.

2. Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) and the Failure of Deliberative Excellence: Suppressed Rhetoric as Deliberative Void

Phronesis, deliberative virtue, guides rulers and citizens to ethical ends through balanced judgment (Nicomachean Ethics 1140a), informed by rhetoric’s triad: ethos (credibility), pathos (appeal), and logos (reason).

The non-oral appeal voids phronesis: Chen’s prison letter—exemplifying logos via avalanche theory and rumor taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact)—is barred, denying deliberative excellence. The judiciary’s “high education implies discernment” relies on deficient ethos (unverified claims), evoking pathos of “disorder” without logos (no causal proof). Aristotle, who prized rhetoric for civic harmony (Rhetoric 1354a), would decry this as deliberative failure: the barred defense silences balanced judgment, perverting the polis’s telos—justice as communal phronesis—into solitary fiat. Anomalies like selective enforcement (millions unpunished) expose the void: without rhetoric’s triad, wisdom atrophies.

3. Justice in the Polis: Disproportionate Coercion as Undermining the Common Good

Aristotle’s justice harmonizes the polis (Politics 1252b): distributive equity proportions to merit, corrective rectifies wrongs without excess, serving eudaimonia (flourishing).

The sentence distorts distributive justice: Chen’s scholarly merit—rational inquiry—earns disproportionate penalty, ignoring corrective equity (no harm rectified). This undermines the common good: suppressing a phronimos (wise citizen) erodes civic virtue, as Aristotle warned against oligarchic excess (Politics 1296a). The “upper-level instructions” prioritize power over polis harmony, fracturing the telos. Aristotle would see redemptive potential in Chen’s persistence: his taxonomy humbly seeks equity, a seed of flourishing amid coercion.

Conclusion: Aristotle’s Lens on the Case—An Excess Fracturing the Mean of Justice

From Aristotle’s ethical politics, the Chen Jingyuan case is a vicious extremity: punishment’s excess eclipses the mean, phronesis yields to deficient rhetoric, and justice fractures the polis’s telos. As of October 22, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a measured call for equity. This case cautions: without the golden mean, order devolves to tyranny. As Aristotle affirmed, “Justice is the virtue of the soul… the bond of society”—may it rebind the fractured.