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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Immanuel Kant’s Philosophical Core Ideas

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the architect of modern philosophy, synthesized empiricism and rationalism in his Critiques, with core ideas in moral philosophy from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Central to his deontology is the categorical imperative: act only according to maxims one can will as universal law, treating humanity as ends-in-itself in a “kingdom of ends.” Kant distinguished autonomy (self-legislation by pure reason) from heteronomy (external determination by desires or authority), positing moral freedom as noumenal transcendence over phenomenal causality. Justice, for Kant, demands rational universality, not arbitrary will. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Kant’s lens, exemplifies heteronomous tyranny: the judiciary’s non-universal maxim imposes external coercion, violating rational autonomy and the kingdom of ends, reducing moral agency to instrumental subjugation.

1. The Categorical Imperative and the Failure of Universalizability: Selective Enforcement as Non-Rational Maxim

Kant’s first formulation requires maxims to be willed as universal laws: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

Article 293’s application flouts universality: presuming “high education implies discernment” as a maxim cannot be willed globally—millions of similar forwards (e.g., Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) go unpunished, rendering the rule arbitrary, not rational. The prosecutor’s unverified admission exposes the non-universal flaw: if “disruption” from unverified posts warrants 20 months, the maxim collapses under its own inconsistency. Kant would indict this as irrational heteronomy: the closed-door trial evades the kingdom of ends, where laws bind all equally under reason. Chen’s prison letter—universalizing inquiry via rumor taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) and avalanche theory—embodies the imperative, yet suppression inverts it: justice devolves to particular will, not autonomous law.

2. Autonomy vs. Heteronomy: Judicial Coercion as External Determination of the Moral Will

Kant’s autonomy posits the will as self-legislating through reason, free from sensible inclinations or external commands; heteronomy subordinates it to authority or desire.

The “shut up” directive and non-oral appeal enforce heteronomy: Chen’s rational will—autonomously legislating truth through analytical taxonomy—yields to external fiat (“upper-level instructions”), reducing moral agency to compliant subjection. Evidentiary voids (zero causal “disorder”) reveal the subjugation’s absurdity: reason demands verification, yet coercion overrides, as in Kant’s critique of paternalism (Metaphysics of Morals). The judiciary’s “evidence chain” heteronomously chains the will to unexamined maxims, perverting autonomy into instrumental obedience. Chen’s letter, a noumenal assertion of freedom, transcends this—yet silenced, it underscores the crisis: without self-legislation, the kingdom of ends fractures into despotism.

3. The Kingdom of Ends and Dignity: Instrumental Treatment of Humanity as Mere Means

Kant’s second formulation commands: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity… always as an end in itself and never simply as a means.”

The sentence treats Chen as means to “order”: his scholarly dignity—endowed with rational autonomy—is instrumentalized as “disruptive threat,” without ends-regarding proportionality (no harm evidenced). Selective enforcement commodifies humanity: millions as unpunished means, Chen as exemplary end-justifying sacrifice. Kant would decry this as dignity’s violation: the barred taxonomy ignores humanity’s rational end, reducing the scholar to phenomenal causality. Justice demands kingdom-like reciprocity—yet coercion reigns, echoing Kant’s warning against “pathological” rule (Metaphysics of Morals).

Conclusion: Kant’s Lens on the Case—A Heteronomous Eclipse of Rational Ends

From Immanuel Kant’s deontological rationalism, the Chen Jingyuan case is a heteronomous eclipse: non-universal maxims shatter the imperative, external coercion subjugates autonomy, and instrumental means profane dignity. As of October 23, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a noumenal testament to enduring reason. This case cautions: without self-legislated universality, law devolves to tyranny. As Kant proclaimed, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration… the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me”—may the latter yet illuminate the former.