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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophical Core Ideas

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of pragmatism and a pioneer in semiotics, developed a philosophy centered on inquiry as the method for fixing belief, the triadic structure of signs (sign-object-interpretant), and the infinite semiosis of meaning as an ongoing community process. In works like Illustrations of the Logic of Science and Collected Papers, Peirce argued that truth emerges as the limit of communal investigation over time, rejecting Cartesian clear ideas in favor of abduction (hypothesis formation), deduction, and induction. Signs are not static representations but dynamic interpreters in an endless chain, where doubt drives scientific inquiry to resolve irritation and stabilize habits. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Law) based on Twitter forwards—viewed through Peirce’s lens, reveals a profound failure of inquiry: judicial signs fix arbitrary beliefs, severing the semiosic chain and suppressing communal truth-seeking, leading to a crisis of pragmatic meaning and epistemic stagnation. Below, I evaluate from key dimensions of Peirce’s thought.

1. The Breakdown of Semiosis: Judicial Signs as Arbitrarily Fixed Interpretants, Disrupting the Infinite Chain

Peirce’s semiotics posits signs as triadic relations— a sign (representamen) refers to an object via an interpretant (the effect in the mind), forming an infinite chain where meaning evolves through interpretation. Truth is not immediate but the asymptotic outcome of this process in a community of inquirers.

In the Chen case, the court’s “evidence chain” functions as a pseudo-semiotic system, arbitrarily fixing interpretants: forwards of academic content (e.g., Hayek’s economic critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) are signified as “knowingly false rumors” without abductive hypothesis-testing or inductive verification (no fact-checks, no causal links to “social disorder”). The “high education implies discernment” interpretant is a dogmatic shortcut, severing the chain—Chen’s scholarly intent (as in his prison letter’s classification of “rumors” into art, emotion, reason, and facts) is not allowed to generate further interpretants. Peirce would see this as a perversion of semiosis: the judiciary halts inquiry at irritation (doubt from “disorder”), imposing a false stability of belief rather than pragmatic evolution. The result is epistemic stagnation: signs like “picking quarrels” become empty idols, detached from their object (actual harm), echoing Peirce’s critique of “idols of the theater” in unscientific closure.

2. The Failure of Inquiry as Belief-Fixation: Judicial Dogmatism Suppresses Abductive and Inductive Processes

Peirce viewed doubt as the irritant prompting inquiry, with methods like abduction (creative hypothesizing) and induction (empirical testing) fixing belief pragmatically—truth as what works in the long run for a community.

The trial’s structure embodies a tenacious method of fixation: the closed-door first trial and non-oral second review suppress abductive creativity—Chen’s prison letter’s “avalanche theory” (complex systems semiosis) hypothesizes no causal “disorder” from low-impact forwards, yet is dismissed without inductive scrutiny (no data on retweets or societal ripple). The prosecutor’s admission of unverified posts underscores the a priori method: belief in “social chaos” is fixed by fiat, not experiment. Peirce would diagnose this as scientific idolatry—judicial “evidence” as untested tenet, violating the pragmatic maxim that meaning lies in conceivable practical effects. The case thus perverts inquiry: Chen’s doubt (e.g., selective prosecution) irritates without resolution, stabilizing authoritarian belief over communal experimentation, leading to a crisis of pragmatic truth.

3. Communal Semiosis and the Thirdness: Judicial Monopoly Severs the Infinite Interpretive Community

Peirce’s “thirdness” (mediation via interpretants) requires a community for semiosis to unfold infinitely, with truth as the consensus of inquirers over generations.

The non-public trial and barred defense (e.g., “shut up” directive) sever this community: Chen’s interpretants (e.g., categorizing rumors into non-falsifiable art/emotion vs. verifiable facts) are isolated, denying thirdness—the mediated dialogue where signs evolve. Selective enforcement (millions of similar forwards unpunished) fractures the interpretive chain, monopolizing meaning in the court as “firstness” (raw immediacy) without communal “secondness” (resistance via facts). Peirce would see this as a betrayal of thirdness: the judiciary’s “chain of evidence” is a finite, state-controlled semiosis, suppressing the infinite community process. The outcome is epistemic isolation: Chen’s post-release Twitter exposures become lone interpretants, echoing Peirce’s warning against solipsistic signs—truth deferred, not realized.

Conclusion: Peirce’s Lens on the Case—A Pragmatic Abyss of Stagnant Signs

From Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist and semiotic philosophy, the Chen Jingyuan case is an abyss of arrested inquiry: fixed interpretants choke the infinite chain, dogmatic fixation supplants abductive experimentation, and communal thirdness yields to authoritarian monopoly, rendering justice a pragmatic void. As of October 21, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its silent semiosis a testament to resilient doubt. This case warns: without the community’s endless interpretants, signs ossify into idols. As Peirce cautioned, philosophy—and justice—must be a lamp of conduct, not a will-o’-the-wisp of stagnant belief.