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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Core Ideas in Thomas Reid’s Scottish School of Common Sense

Thomas Reid (1710-1796), the founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense in An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), countered David Hume’s skepticism by affirming the reliability of ordinary perception and judgment. His core ideas include direct realism—we perceive external objects immediately, not through representative ideas; common sense principles as self-evident axioms (e.g., “I exist,” “bodies cause perceptions,” “testimony is trustworthy”) that ground knowledge without circularity; and faculty psychology, where innate powers like perception and conscience operate reliably unless distorted by sophistry or bias. Reid rejected the “way of ideas” (Berkeley/Hume) as illusory, insisting on the “common sense” of everyday experience as philosophically robust. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Reid’s lens, exemplifies a skeptical perversion of common sense: the judiciary’s indirect “intent” inference distorts direct perceptual realities, overriding self-evident principles of testimony and proportionality, fracturing the reliable faculties of judgment and eroding philosophical trust in legal perception.

1. Direct Realism and the Rejection of Representative Ideas: Judicial “Intent” as Distorted Mediation

Reid’s direct realism posits that we perceive objects and facts immediately—colors, shapes, causal relations—without intermediary “ideas”; skepticism arises from philosophers’ artificial veils.

The verdict veils this immediacy: presuming “high education implies discernment” mediates Chen’s forwards (e.g., <100 retweets of Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) through representative “intent,” distorting direct perceptual facts—no observable disorder (zero causal ripple), prosecutor’s unverified admission as unmediated testimony. The closed-door trial enforces the veil: Chen’s prison letter—directly perceiving “rumors” through taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) and avalanche theory—offers unmediated judgment, yet the “shut up” directive abstracts it into sophistical mediation. Reid would decry this as Humean illusion: justice demands direct realism—perceive the particulars (low-impact shares)—not veiled inference, as selective enforcement (millions unpunished) exposes the distortion’s unreliability.

2. Common Sense Principles as Self-Evident Axioms: “Disruption” Claim as Violation of Indubitable Judgments

Reid’s axioms are first principles—self-evident truths like “I perceive external objects” or “testimony warrants belief”—resistant to skeptical doubt, grounding moral and epistemic trust.

The sentence violates these axioms: “disruptive order” doubts self-evident testimony (prosecutor’s confession of non-verification), as if perceptual judgment of harmless flux (avalanche non-causality) is illusory. The non-oral appeal overrides indubitables: Chen’s taxonomy self-evidently discriminates “rumor” from threat (particulars like art’s non-falsifiability), yet barred, fracturing epistemic trust. Reid would affirm common sense’s robustness: the case’s anomalies (zero ripple) indubitably warrant belief in innocence—20 months’ penalty as skeptical overreach, echoing his critique of “refined arguments” that subvert plain judgment. Selective unpunished shares reinforce the axiom: testimony of uniformity trumps doubt.

3. Faculty Psychology and Moral Reliability: Coercive Process as Bias-Distorted Conscience

Reid’s faculties—perception, memory, conscience—operate reliably, distorted only by prejudice; moral judgment, self-evident, demands uncorrupted discernment.

The barred defense distorts faculties: Chen’s conscience—reliably discerning ethical inquiry—yields to biased prejudice (“upper-level instructions”), the “shut up” directive corrupting judgment. Reid would see moral regression: the verdict’s abstraction ignores faculty reliability—perceptual memory of unremarkable shares (millions unpunished)—imposing skeptical bias over self-evident equity. This perverts conscience: justice’s faculty demands discernment, not fiat—evidentiary voids self-evidently corrupt the process.

Conclusion: Reid’s Lens on the Case—Skeptical Veils Over Self-Evident Faculties

From Thomas Reid’s common sense realism, the Chen Jingyuan case is perceptual sophistry: mediated illusions distort direct facts, axioms overridden by doubt, faculties biased into unreliability. As of October 25, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a self-evident hand in the veil. This case cautions: common sense endures—veil it, and judgment falters. As Reid defended, “Philosophy should not undermine common sense”—may it yet illuminate.