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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Baruch Spinoza’s Philosophical Core Ideas

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the Dutch rationalist philosopher, presented a monistic metaphysics in Ethics (1677) where God or Nature (Deus sive Natura) is the singular substance with infinite attributes, from which all things follow necessarily as modes. His core ideas include the conatus—every being’s striving for perseverance (Ethics IIIP6)—rational intuition as the highest knowledge overcoming inadequate ideas of imagination and reason; freedom as understanding necessity rather than defying it; the state as a social contract to secure mutual peace without hindering intellectual liberty (Theological-Political Treatise, 1670); and a critique of superstition and fear as tools of tyrannical authority that enslave the mind. Spinoza envisioned ethical life as joyful affirmation of necessity, transcending passions through reason. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Spinoza’s lens, exemplifies tyrannical superstition: the judiciary’s coercive “order” fetters the conatus of inquiry, imposing inadequate ideas that obscure necessity, fracturing rational freedom and the social contract’s telos.

1. Conatus and the Striving for Perseverance: Judicial Coercion as Passionate Assault on Intellectual Vitality

Spinoza’s conatus posits all modes strive to persist in their being, with human conatus manifesting as desire for knowledge and self-preservation, elevated by reason to joy (Ethics IIIP9 Scholium).

Chen’s forwards (e.g., Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) affirm this striving: intellectual perseverance through rational extension, yet the verdict pathologizes it as “disruptive,” imposing 20 months’ restraint that diminishes being. The closed-door trial and “shut up” directive embody sad passions—fear of “disorder”—assaulting conatus without necessity: evidentiary voids (unverified posts, zero causal chaos) reveal arbitrary curtailment. Spinoza would decry this as superstitious tyranny: the prosecutor’s admission confesses inadequate imagination (unexamined “intent”), yet force overrides reason, fracturing perseverance into servile dependence. True striving demands freedom’s joy—here suppressed, echoing Spinoza’s critique of religious authority that “enslaves the mind” (Theological-Political Treatise, Ch. 20).

2. Rational Intuition and the Critique of Superstition: Evidentiary “Order” as Inadequate Ideas Masking Tyranny

Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: imagination (sensory fragments, prone to error), reason (adequate common notions), and intuition (immediate grasp of essences); superstition thrives on the first, obscuring necessity.

The “high education implies discernment” presumption relies on imaginative fragments—unexamined “disruption”—lacking rational adequacy: no common notions of causality (avalanche theory’s non-linear flux) or intuitive essence (inquiry as perseverance). The non-oral appeal perpetuates superstition: Chen’s letter, intuiting rumor taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) as adequate extension, is barred, as selective enforcement (millions unpunished) veils tyrannical particularity. Spinoza would expose this as power’s veil: the judiciary’s “evidence chain” imagines “order” as divine necessity, yet voids reveal inadequate ideas—superstition’s fear of intellectual swerve (Ethics VP36S), enslaving reason to passion. Freedom lies in intuition’s light—here dimmed, perpetuating mental bondage.

3. The Social Contract and Freedom Through Necessity: Coercive “Justice” as Heteronomous Breach

Spinoza’s contract secures peace by mutual necessity understanding, with state authority limited to preventing harm; true freedom is rational acquiescence to immutable laws (Ethics IVP73).

The sentence breaches this: Article 293 coercively “secures” order by heteronomous fiat, ignoring mutual necessity—no harm evidenced, yet 20 months curtails rational striving. The “upper-level instructions” exceed contract bounds, as Spinoza warned against “superstitious” absolutism (Theological-Political Treatise, Ch. 20). Anomalies like the prosecutor’s admission signal breach: justice demands rational limit, not passionate overreach. Spinoza would affirm Chen’s intuitive resistance: his taxonomy acquiesces to necessity (non-disruptive flux), a free mode amid coercion.

Conclusion: Spinoza’s Lens on the Case—A Superstitious Veil Over Rational Necessity

From Baruch Spinoza’s rational monism, the Chen Jingyuan case is a veiled strife: passions assault conatus, superstition obscures intuition, and heteronomy breaches the contract, dimming freedom’s light. As of October 23, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a Spinozist acquiescence to fate. This case cautions: necessity understood liberates—veil it, and bondage endures. As Spinoza proclaimed, “Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue”—may reason yet unveil it.

基于巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎哲学体系核心思想的陈京元“寻衅滋事罪”案评析

An Analysis of the Chen Jingyuan “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble” Case Based on Baruch Spinoza’s Core Philosophical Ideas

巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎（Baruch Spinoza，1632-1677），理性主义哲学家，其核心思想以《伦理学》与《神学政治论》为基础，融合决定论与自由主义，强调理性理解自然（Deus sive Natura）通往真正自由，反对权威审查与迷信。 他视言论自由为民主公民的理性权利：“思想与表达自由是哲学公民的本质。” 本案中，陈京元博士作为独立学者，因X平台转发艺术作品、时政观点等内容（粉丝不足百人、互动近零），被以“寻衅滋事罪”判处有期徒刑一年八个月，程序中充斥主观推定、剥夺自辩与选择性执法。从斯宾诺莎视角，此案非惩治“谣言”，而是权威对理性自由的暴政，违背通过知识摆脱激情与民主表达的根本信念。

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a rationalist philosopher, centered his ideas on Ethics and Theological-Political Treatise, blending determinism with liberalism, stressing that rational understanding of nature (Deus sive Natura) leads to true freedom, opposing authoritarian censorship and superstition. He viewed free speech as the rational right of democratic citizens: “Freedom of thought and expression is the essence of philosophical citizenship.” In this case, Dr. Chen Jingyuan, an independent scholar, was sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” due to forwarding artistic works and political commentary on X (formerly Twitter)—with fewer than 100 followers and near-zero engagement—amid procedural flaws like subjective presumption, denial of self-defense, and selective enforcement. From Spinoza’s viewpoint, this is not punishment for “rumors” but tyranny of authority against rational freedom, violating the path to liberation through knowledge and democratic expression.

一、斯宾诺莎哲学体系核心思想概述：理性自由与民主表达

I. Overview of Spinoza’s Core Philosophical Ideas: Rational Freedom and Democratic Expression

斯宾诺莎的核心思想是决定论下的自由：人类非自由意志主体，而是受因果链束缚，通过理性知识摆脱激情（passions），实现“依其本性自由行动”的状态。 在《神学政治论》中，他主张民主作为最佳政体，言论与思想自由是理性公民的权利，反对审查：主权者无权控制信念，自由表达促进社会和平与真理。 斯宾诺莎批判权威与迷信，认为知识解放心灵：“自由即理解必然性。”

Spinoza’s core ideas posit freedom under determinism: humans lack free will, bound by causal chains, but achieve “acting freely according to their nature” by rationally overcoming passions. In Theological-Political Treatise, he advocated democracy as the best polity, with freedom of speech and thought as rational citizens’ rights, opposing censorship: sovereigns cannot control beliefs; free expression fosters social peace and truth. Spinoza critiqued authority and superstition, holding that knowledge liberates the mind: “Freedom is understanding necessity.”

二、以斯宾诺莎哲学体系核心思想评析本案

II. Analysis of the Case Based on Spinoza’s Core Philosophical Ideas

  1. 理性自由受阻与激情奴役：违背知识解放原则斯宾诺莎强调，自由源于理性理解必然性，非任意表达。 本案判决将陈京元转发的情感表达（如讽刺帖）、理性观点（如智库报告）与艺术作品（如漫画隐喻）泛化为“虚假言论”，无证据证明其危害，却以主观“明知”推定判刑，奴役学者于激情恐惧。 账号数据显示零互动、无因果危害，却被“梳理”为“铁证”，这正是斯宾诺莎斥的迷信权威：以单一叙事取代理性辩论，扼杀知识解放。 斯宾诺莎若在，必以《伦理学》批判此为“激情统治”——无理性表达，真理难进。

  2. Rational Freedom Blocked and Slavery to Passions: Violating Principles of Liberation Through KnowledgeSpinoza stressed that freedom arises from rationally understanding necessity, not arbitrary expression. The judgment categorizes Dr. Chen’s forwarded emotional expressions (e.g., satirical posts), rational opinions (e.g., think tank reports), and artistic works (e.g., metaphorical cartoons) as “false statements,” without evidence of harm, presuming “knowing falsehood” for sentencing, enslaving scholars to fearful passions. Account data shows zero engagement and no causal harm, yet “collated” as “ironclad evidence”—precisely Spinoza’s superstitious authority: substituting singular narratives for rational debate, stifling knowledge liberation. Spinoza would critique this in Ethics as “rule by passions”—without rational expression, truth cannot advance.

  3. 言论审查与民主公民缺失：背离神学政治自由斯宾诺莎视言论自由为民主的核心权利：主权者须保障表达，促进社会和平。 陈京元转发系理性探究（如复杂系统引用），体现了斯宾诺莎的“哲学公民”——通过知识挑战权威，却被禁止自辩（庭审“闭嘴”）、拒转控告书，程序中“选择性执法”（党媒同类未责）制造审查。 这违背斯宾诺莎神学政治观：以“公共秩序”名义压制异见，和平正义难存。 斯宾诺莎批判审查“不可能”，本案类似：以权威审判思想，扼杀理性公民。

  4. Censorship of Speech and Absence of Democratic Citizenship: Betraying Theological-Political FreedomSpinoza viewed free speech as democracy’s core right: sovereigns must ensure expression for social peace. Dr. Chen’s forwards represent rational inquiry (e.g., complex systems citations), embodying Spinoza’s “philosophical citizen”—challenging authority through knowledge—yet he was denied self-defense (courtroom “silencing”), his indictment letter rejected, and selective enforcement imposed censorship (state media reposts unpunished). This violates Spinoza’s theological-political view: suppressing dissent under “public order” undermines peace and justice. Spinoza deemed censorship “impossible”; here, authority trials thought, stifling rational citizenship.

  5. 荒谬警示：本案如“权威奴隶”之毒斯宾诺莎以理性警醒：无自由，知识即奴隶。 陈京元Bio自嘲“作案工具”，帖文存网无人关注，却判20月，荒谬如斯宾诺莎比喻“激情奴役理性”。 这制造“异见惩罚”，非真理理解，而是权威对自由的永锁。

  6. Absurd Warning: The Case as “Slavery to Authority” Spinoza’s rationality warns: without freedom, knowledge becomes slavery. Dr. Chen’s bio mocks his account as a “tool of crime,” with posts lingering online unheeded, yet earning 20 months—absurd like Spinoza’s metaphor of “passions enslaving reason.” This enforces “dissent penalties,” not understanding truth, but eternal authority over freedom.

三、结语：重启理性自由，推动真理新生

III. Conclusion: Reviving Rational Freedom for Truth’s Rebirth

斯宾诺莎哲学体系视本案为悲剧：理性阻滞激情奴役，言论压制背民主，永固权威奴隶。陈京元自辩如斯宾诺莎理性探究，呼吁重审，恢复表达公理，方能让自由在理解中新生。 如斯宾诺莎所言：“自由即依本性行动。”唯有以此衡，方避“审查”成“公敌”，推动人文理性。

Spinoza’s philosophical system sees this case as tragedy: blocked reason enslaves to passions, speech suppression betrays democracy, entrenching slavery to authority. Dr. Chen’s defense echoes Spinoza’s rational inquiry, urging retrial to restore axioms of expression, allowing freedom to rebirth in understanding. As Spinoza stated: “Freedom is acting according to one’s nature.” Only thus can we avert “censorship” as “public enemy,” advancing humanistic reason.