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Legal Analysis of the Use of Chen Jingyuan’s Retweet of the “Petrichor” Post as Evidence for “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble” in the Kunming Public Security, Procuratorate, and Judicial System

Introduction

Chen Jingyuan, a PhD holder, was convicted of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PXQT) under Article 293 of China’s Criminal Law by the Xishan District Court in Kunming, with the conviction upheld by the Kunming Intermediate Court. He was sentenced to 20 months in prison. One piece of evidence used against him was his retweet of a post by the Twitter account “Petrichor” on April 4, 2022. The post criticizes China’s stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, accusing China of “ingratitude and betrayal” toward Ukraine, and includes an image of an article titled “The Ukraine That Disappeared from Middle School Textbooks: China’s Image of Ingratitude and Betrayal.” The article details China’s historical reliance on Ukrainian military technology (e.g., the origins of the Liaoning aircraft carrier) while supporting Russia in the conflict. The Kunming public security, procuratorate, and judicial system (collectively, the “Kunming authorities”) used this retweet as evidence for Chen’s PXQT conviction. This analysis examines the legal basis under Chinese law for this use, as well as the shortcomings and errors in its application.

Legal Framework for PXQT in the Context of Online Activity

  1. Article 293 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China Article 293 defines the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and includes four specific acts. The relevant provision for online activity, as applied in Chen’s case, is likely Article 293(1)(4): “causing a disturbance in a public place, resulting in serious disorder in public order.” In judicial practice, “public place” has been extended to online spaces, such as Twitter/X, and “serious disorder” is assessed based on the impact of the disseminated content.

  2. 2013 Judicial Interpretation on Handling Defamation and Other Criminal Cases via Information Networks Issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “Two Highs Interpretation”), this interpretation provides specific guidance for applying Article 293 to online activities:

    • Article 5(2): Knowingly disseminating false information online that causes serious disruption to public order can constitute PXQT.

    • Article 2: Sets quantitative thresholds for “serious disruption,” such as 500 reposts or 5,000 views, or qualitative impacts like triggering protests or public panic.

    • The interpretation emphasizes that the content must be “false,” the dissemination must be intentional (with knowledge of falsity), and the result must be a significant disturbance to public order.

  3. Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) Requirements for Evidence

    • Article 53: Evidence must be sufficient, conclusive, and exclude reasonable doubt to support a conviction.

    • Article 55: Electronic evidence (e.g., retweets) must be verified for authenticity and relevance, and its collection must comply with legal procedures.

Legal Basis for Using the Retweet as Evidence for PXQT

The Kunming authorities likely relied on the following legal reasoning to use Chen’s retweet of the “Petrichor” post as evidence for PXQT:

  1. Content of the Retweet as “False Information”

    • Legal Standard: Article 5(2) of the Two Highs Interpretation requires that the disseminated information be “false” to qualify as PXQT. “False information” typically refers to fabricated facts, not opinions or subjective expressions, though judicial practice often interprets this broadly in politically sensitive cases.

    • Application to the Post: The retweet in question contains the following:

      • Text: “Ingratitude and betrayal.” (Translated from Chinese: 负恩忘义，翻脸背叛。)

      • Image: An article titled “The Ukraine That Disappeared from Middle School Textbooks: China’s Image of Ingratitude and Betrayal,” which details China’s historical reliance on Ukrainian military technology (e.g., the purchase of the Varyag aircraft carrier, later the Liaoning, and cooperation with Motor Sich for aviation engines) and criticizes China for supporting Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, betraying Ukraine’s past contributions. The Kunming authorities likely classified this content as “false information,” arguing that:

      • The post and article accuse China of “ingratitude and betrayal” in its foreign policy, which the authorities may view as “distorting” China’s diplomatic stance and damaging its national image.

      • The article claims China violated an agreement not to use the Varyag for military purposes, which the authorities might interpret as “smearing” China by exaggerating negative aspects of its actions.

      • The content could be deemed provocative, potentially inciting anti-government sentiment or social instability, especially given the sensitivity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Nature of the Content: The post and article are based on historical facts (e.g., China’s purchase of the Varyag from Ukraine and its military cooperation with Motor Sich) and public information (China’s stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict), followed by critical commentary. This constitutes historical narration and political opinion, not fabricated facts. The Two Highs Interpretation requires “false information” to be factually inaccurate and fabricated, not historical accounts or subjective criticism.

      • Authenticity Dispute: The article’s claims about the Varyag purchase and the condition of “non-military use” are well-documented historical facts, corroborated by replies to the post (e.g., @ShiLiPingHu mentions the Varyag’s transfer and the condition of non-military use). The authorities did not provide evidence to prove the content was “false” (e.g., showing that China did not acquire the Varyag or did not support Russia). Labeling it “false” based solely on its critical tone violates the Criminal Procedure Law Article 53 requirement for clear and sufficient evidence.

  • Political Bias in Classification: Classifying historical commentary and political criticism as “false” conflates dissent with criminal behavior, exceeding the scope of Article 293 and violating the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege).

  1. Chen’s Act of Retweeting as “Dissemination” with Subjective Intent

    • Legal Standard: Article 5(2) requires that the defendant “knowingly” disseminates false information, meaning they must have subjective intent or knowledge of the content’s falsity. Article 14 of the Criminal Law further mandates proof of intent, either direct (hoping for the result) or indirect (recklessly allowing the result).

    • Application to Chen’s Retweet: By retweeting the post, Chen engaged in an act of dissemination on a public platform (Twitter/X), which the authorities likely interpreted as meeting the “public place” requirement of Article 293(1)(4). They may have inferred Chen’s “knowledge of falsity” based on his education level (PhD), arguing that a highly educated individual “should have known” the content was false or harmful due to its politically sensitive nature. The authorities might also have claimed that Chen’s act of retweeting, without adding disclaimers or critical commentary, implies endorsement of the content, thus satisfying the intent requirement.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Lack of Evidence for “Knowing” Intent: Under Criminal Law Article 14, subjective intent requires proof that the accused knew the information was false and intended or was reckless about causing harm. The authorities provided no direct evidence (e.g., Chen’s statements, prior actions, or messages) to show he knew the content was false. Retweeting, especially without modification, does not inherently demonstrate “knowing” dissemination of falsehoods, particularly if Chen viewed the content as historical commentary rather than a factual claim. Chen’s appeal and prison letter assert he was uncertain of the content’s truthfulness and acted out of academic curiosity, undermining the “knowing” element.

      • Improper Presumption: Inferring intent from Chen’s education violates the Criminal Procedure Law Article 12 (presumption of innocence) and Article 53 (burden of proof). The court’s assumption that a PhD holder “should know” the content was false reverses the burden of proof, requiring Chen to disprove intent rather than the prosecution proving it.

      • Political Motivation: The authorities’ focus on the content’s political sensitivity suggests they equated dissent with criminal intent, rather than proving Chen’s actual knowledge or intent to cause disorder, reflecting a politically driven application of the law.

  2. Alleged “Serious Disruption of Public Order”

    • Legal Standard: Article 293(1)(4) and Article 2 of the Two Highs Interpretation require that the act causes “serious disorder in public order,” either through quantitative metrics (e.g., 500 reposts, 5,000 views) or qualitative impacts (e.g., protests, public panic, or government intervention).

    • Application to the Retweet: The Kunming authorities likely argued that Chen’s retweet contributed to “serious disorder” by spreading content critical of China’s foreign policy, which could incite anti-government sentiment or destabilize social harmony, especially given the sensitivity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. They might have claimed that the post’s accusations of “ingratitude and betrayal” are provocative, potentially leading to unrest or undermining public trust in the state, even if the actual impact was minimal. In Chinese judicial practice, “public order” is often interpreted broadly to include ideological stability, particularly in cases involving criticism of the government or its foreign policy.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Failure to Meet Quantitative Thresholds: The Two Highs Interpretation Article 2 sets clear metrics for “serious disruption” in online cases: 500 reposts or 5,000 views, or actual harm like protests or public panic. Chen’s retweet, as part of his broader activity, involved an account with fewer than 100 total reposts over 20 years (per his appeal and prison letter), far below the 500-repost threshold. The authorities provided no evidence that this specific retweet met the quantitative criteria or caused measurable harm (e.g., protests, panic).

      • Limited Reach of X in China: X is blocked in mainland China and accessible only via circumvention tools (e.g., VPNs), significantly limiting its audience. The authorities did not explain how a retweet on a platform with restricted access could cause “serious disruption” within China, especially with such low engagement.

      • Presumption of Harm: The authorities likely presumed harm based on the content’s political sensitivity rather than proving actual disruption. This approach contradicts the Criminal Procedure Law Article 53, which requires clear evidence of consequences, and violates the principle of proportionality in criminal law, as the 20-month sentence is disproportionate to the unproven harm.

  3. Use of Electronic Evidence

    • Legal Standard: Article 55 of the CPL requires that electronic evidence (e.g., retweets) be verified for authenticity, relevance, and legality of collection. The Two Highs Interpretation also implies that online activity must be directly attributable to the defendant.

    • Application to the Retweet: The authorities likely obtained Chen’s retweet through digital forensics (e.g., cached data from his device or X account), presenting it as evidence of his act of dissemination. They would argue that the retweet, timestamped and linked to Chen’s account, satisfies the evidentiary requirement of proving the act.

    • Potential Issue: The case documents do not specify how the retweet was collected or verified. If the authorities failed to follow legal procedures (e.g., obtaining a proper search warrant) or did not verify the data’s authenticity (e.g., ensuring it was not tampered with), the evidence could be inadmissible under Criminal Procedure Law Article 50 (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence). Additionally, the relevance of a single retweet is questionable if its specific impact on public order was not proven.

Shortcomings and Errors in the Legal Application

  1. Misclassification of Content as “False Information”

    • Shortcoming: The post and article are grounded in historical facts (e.g., the Varyag purchase) and public information (China’s stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict), followed by critical commentary. Classifying this as “false information” lacks factual basis and conflates political dissent with criminal behavior.

    • Error:

      • Violation of Article 293 and the Two Highs Interpretation: The Two Highs Interpretation requires “false information” to be fabricated facts, not historical accounts or political opinions.

      • Violation of CPL Article 53: The authorities failed to provide evidence proving the content was “false,” relying instead on its critical nature, which constitutes an error in legal application.

      • Violation of International Standards: The ICCPR Article 19 protects freedom of expression, including the right to criticize government policies. Labeling such speech as “false” is an unlawful restriction on free expression.

  2. Flawed Presumption of Subjective Intent

    • Shortcoming: The authorities inferred Chen’s “knowing” intent based on his education (PhD), but lacked direct evidence, relying on presumptive reasoning rather than factual proof.

    • Error:

      • Violation of CPL Articles 12 and 53: Subjective intent must be proven with objective evidence (e.g., Chen’s statements or behavior), not assumed based on education, violating the presumption of innocence and burden of proof.

      • Violation of Criminal Law Article 14: The requirement of intent demands clear evidence of “knowing” dissemination, which is absent here. Chen’s stated academic curiosity undermines the “knowing” element.

      • Political Bias: The presumption of intent appears driven by the content’s political sensitivity rather than Chen’s actual state of mind, indicating a politically motivated application.

  3. Inadequate Proof of “Serious Disruption of Public Order”

    • Shortcoming: The authorities failed to provide evidence of “serious disruption,” relying on the content’s sensitivity to presume potential harm without proving actual consequences.

    • Error:

      • Violation of Two Highs Interpretation Article 2: Chen’s retweet did not meet the quantitative thresholds (500 reposts or 5,000 views) and no actual harm (e.g., protests, panic) was demonstrated.

      • Violation of CPL Article 53: The causal link between the retweet and “serious disruption” was not proven, especially given X’s limited reach in China.

      • Violation of Proportionality: The 20-month sentence is disproportionate to the unproven harm, violating the principle of proportionality in criminal law.

  4. Potential Issues with Electronic Evidence

    • Shortcoming: The case documents do not specify how the retweet was collected or verified, raising questions about the evidence’s legality and relevance.

    • Error:

      • Potential Violation of CPL Article 50: If the evidence was collected without proper legal procedures (e.g., a search warrant), it may be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

      • Violation of CPL Article 55: The relevance of a single retweet is questionable if its specific impact on public order was not proven, failing the requirement for evidentiary relevance.

  5. Broader Issues of Selective Enforcement and Political Motivation

    • Shortcoming: Chen’s appeal and prison letter note that the original poster, “Petrichor,” and other retweeters were not prosecuted, indicating selective enforcement.

    • Error:

      • Violation of Criminal Law Article 4: Selective enforcement violates the principle of equality before the law.

      • Political Suppression: The use of Article 293 as a “pocket crime” to suppress politically sensitive speech suggests this case may be an abuse of law to silence dissent.

      • Legal Ambiguity: As noted by NPC member Zhu Zhengfu in 2022, the vagueness of Article 293 creates space for selective enforcement, undermining public rights and judicial credibility.

Conclusion

The Kunming authorities’ use of Chen Jingyuan’s retweet of the “Petrichor” post as evidence for PXQT is based on the following legal reasoning:

  1. Content as “False Information”: The authorities deemed the post “false” for criticizing China’s foreign policy.

  2. Subjective Intent: They inferred Chen’s “knowing” intent based on his education.

  3. Serious Disruption of Public Order: They claimed the retweet could cause social unrest.

  4. Electronic Evidence: The retweet was used as proof of dissemination.

Shortcomings and Errors:

  • The post’s content is historical narration and political criticism, not “false information,” making the classification erroneous.

  • The presumption of subjective intent lacks evidence, violating the presumption of innocence.

  • No “serious disruption” was proven, relying on presumed harm, exceeding legal standards.

  • The legality and relevance of the electronic evidence are questionable.

  • Selective enforcement and political motivations suggest an abuse of law to suppress dissent.

This case highlights the overly broad application of Article 293 in politically sensitive cases, underscoring the need for clearer legal definitions and stricter evidentiary standards to protect free expression and prevent legal abuse.

Key Legal References

  • Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 4, 14, 293

  • Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 12, 50, 53, 55

  • Two Highs Interpretation (2013), Articles 2, 5(2)

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on the provided information and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a professional lawyer for specific legal guidance. Grok Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.

Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.

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