A article about “Self-funded fifty-centers” on CCP’s media

Legal Analysis of the Use of Chen Jingyuan’s Retweet of the “LT 視界” Post as Evidence for “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble” in the Kunming Public Security, Procuratorate, and Judicial System

Introduction

Chen Jingyuan, a PhD holder, was convicted of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PXQT) under Article 293 of China’s Criminal Law by the Xishan District Court in Kunming, with the conviction upheld by the Kunming Intermediate Court. One piece of evidence used against him was his retweet of a [post] by the Twitter account [“LT 視界”(@ltshijie)] on June 8, 2020. The post references a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media outlet praising “自干五” (self-funded “fifty-centers,” or self-motivated online supporters of the CCP) as “staunch practitioners of socialist core values,” and sarcastically predicts that the CCP media might next call “五毛” (paid online commentators) the “propaganda team and volunteer army.” The Kunming public security, procuratorate, and judicial system (collectively, the “Kunming authorities”) used this retweet as evidence for Chen’s PXQT conviction. This analysis examines the legal basis under Chinese law for this use, focusing on the legal framework, elements of the crime, and potential issues with the application of the law.

Legal Framework for PXQT in the Context of Online Activity

  1. Article 293 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China Article 293 defines the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and includes four specific acts. The relevant provision for online activity, as applied in Chen’s case, is likely Article 293(1)(4): “causing a disturbance in a public place, resulting in serious disorder in public order.” In judicial practice, “public place” has been extended to online spaces, such as Twitter/X, and “serious disorder” is assessed based on the impact of the disseminated content.

  2. 2013 Judicial Interpretation on Handling Defamation and Other Criminal Cases via Information Networks Issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “Two Highs Interpretation”), this interpretation provides specific guidance for applying Article 293 to online activities:

    • Article 5(2): Knowingly disseminating false information online that causes serious disruption to public order can constitute PXQT.

    • Article 2: Sets quantitative thresholds for “serious disruption,” such as 500 reposts or 5,000 views, or qualitative impacts like triggering protests or public panic.

    • The interpretation emphasizes that the content must be “false,” the dissemination must be intentional (with knowledge of falsity), and the result must be a significant disturbance to public order.

  3. Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) Requirements for Evidence

    • Article 53: Evidence must be sufficient, conclusive, and exclude reasonable doubt to support a conviction.

    • Article 55: Electronic evidence (e.g., retweets) must be verified for authenticity and relevance, and its collection must comply with legal procedures.

Legal Basis for Using the Retweet as Evidence for PXQT

The Kunming authorities likely relied on the following legal reasoning to use Chen’s retweet of the “LT 視界” post as evidence for PXQT:

  1. Content of the Retweet as “False Information”

    • Legal Standard: Article 5(2) of the Two Highs Interpretation requires that the disseminated information be “false” to qualify as PXQT. “False information” typically refers to fabricated facts, not opinions or subjective expressions, though judicial practice often interprets this broadly in politically sensitive cases.

    • Application to the Post: The [retweet] in question contains the following:

      • Text: “CCP media: ‘自干五’ are staunch practitioners of socialist core values; waiting for the next CCP media piece: ‘五毛’ are the propaganda team and volunteer army of socialist core values.” (Translated from Chinese: 中共党媒：「自干五」是社会主义核心价值观的坚定践行者；坐等，中共党媒下一篇：「五毛」是社会主义核心价值观的宣传队和义勇军。)

      • Image: A long image with the title “CCP Media: 自干五 Are Practitioners of Socialist Core Values,” quoting a CCP media article that praises “自干五” as “self-funded fifty-centers” and contrasting them with “五毛” (paid commentators), followed by sarcastic commentary on the CCP’s propaganda tactics. The Kunming authorities likely classified this content as “false information,” arguing that:

      • The post sarcastically predicts that CCP media might call “五毛” a “propaganda team and volunteer army,” which could be seen as “distorting” the intentions of CCP media or “maliciously speculating” about state propaganda efforts, potentially damaging the state’s image.

      • The mention of “自干五” and “五毛” in a critical context might be interpreted as “smearing” the CCP’s online public opinion management mechanisms, questioning their legitimacy.

      • The content could be deemed provocative, potentially inciting dissatisfaction with the CCP’s propaganda system and affecting social stability.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Nature of the Content: The post cites a real CCP media report (“自干五 are staunch practitioners of socialist core values”) and builds on it with sarcastic commentary, predicting a future narrative about “五毛.” This is a subjective opinion and political satire, not a fabrication of facts. The Two Highs Interpretation requires “false information” to be factually inaccurate and fabricated, not opinions or satirical commentary. International legal standards (e.g., ICCPR Article 19) protect political satire and commentary as free expression.

      • Lack of Factual Basis: The authorities did not provide evidence to prove the post’s content was “false” (e.g., showing that the CCP media report was fabricated or the commentary was factually incorrect). Labeling it “false” based solely on its critical tone and political sensitivity violates the Criminal Procedure Law Article 53 requirement for clear and sufficient evidence.

      • Political Bias in Classification: Classifying political satire and commentary as “false” conflates free expression with criminal behavior, exceeding the scope of Article 293 and violating the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege).

  2. Chen’s Act of Retweeting as “Dissemination” with Subjective Intent

    • Legal Standard: Article 5(2) requires that the defendant “knowingly” disseminates false information, meaning they must have subjective intent or knowledge of the content’s falsity. Article 14 of the Criminal Law further mandates proof of intent, either direct (hoping for the result) or indirect (recklessly allowing the result).

    • Application to Chen’s Retweet: By retweeting the post, Chen engaged in an act of dissemination on a public platform (Twitter/X), which the authorities likely interpreted as meeting the “public place” requirement of Article 293(1)(4). They may have inferred Chen’s “knowledge of falsity” based on his education level (PhD), arguing that a highly educated individual “should have known” the content was false or harmful due to its politically sensitive nature. The authorities might also have claimed that Chen’s act of retweeting, without adding disclaimers or critical commentary, implies endorsement of the content, thus satisfying the intent requirement.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Lack of Evidence for “Knowing” Intent: Under Criminal Law Article 14, subjective intent requires proof that the accused knew the information was false and intended or was reckless about causing harm. The authorities provided no direct evidence (e.g., Chen’s statements, prior actions, or messages) to show he knew the post was false. Retweeting, especially without modification, does not inherently demonstrate “knowing” dissemination of falsehoods, particularly if Chen viewed the content as legitimate satire or commentary. Chen’s appeal and prison letter assert he was uncertain of the content’s truthfulness and acted out of academic curiosity, undermining the “knowing” element.

      • Improper Presumption: Inferring intent from Chen’s education violates the Criminal Procedure Law Article 12 (presumption of innocence) and Article 53 (burden of proof). The court’s assumption that a PhD holder “should know” the content was false reverses the burden of proof, requiring Chen to disprove intent rather than the prosecution proving it.

      • Political Motivation: The authorities’ focus on the content’s political sensitivity suggests they equated dissent with criminal intent, rather than proving Chen’s actual knowledge or intent to cause disorder, reflecting a politically driven application of the law.

  3. Alleged “Serious Disruption of Public Order”

    • Legal Standard: Article 293(1)(4) and Article 2 of the Two Highs Interpretation require that the act causes “serious disorder in public order,” either through quantitative metrics (e.g., 500 reposts, 5,000 views) or qualitative impacts (e.g., protests, public panic, or government intervention).

    • Application to the Retweet: The Kunming authorities likely argued that Chen’s retweet contributed to “serious disorder” by spreading content that mocks the CCP’s propaganda efforts, which could incite anti-government sentiment or destabilize social harmony, especially given the sensitivity of topics involving “自干五” and “五毛.” They might have claimed that the sarcastic commentary (“五毛 are the propaganda team and volunteer army”) is provocative, potentially leading to unrest or undermining public trust in the state, even if the actual impact was minimal. In Chinese judicial practice, “public order” is often interpreted broadly to include ideological stability, particularly in cases involving criticism of the government or its mechanisms.

    • Potential Issue:

      • Failure to Meet Quantitative Thresholds: The Two Highs Interpretation Article 2 sets clear metrics for “serious disruption” in online cases: 500 reposts or 5,000 views, or actual harm like protests or public panic. Chen’s retweet, as part of his broader activity, involved an account with fewer than 100 total reposts over 20 years (per his appeal and prison letter), far below the 500-repost threshold. The authorities provided no evidence that this specific retweet met the quantitative criteria or caused measurable harm (e.g., protests, panic).

      • Limited Reach of X in China: X is blocked in mainland China and accessible only via circumvention tools (e.g., VPNs), significantly limiting its audience. The authorities did not explain how a retweet on a platform with restricted access could cause “serious disruption” within China, especially with such low engagement.

      • Presumption of Harm: The authorities likely presumed harm based on the content’s political sensitivity rather than proving actual disruption. This approach contradicts the Criminal Procedure Law Article 53, which requires clear evidence of consequences, and violates the principle of proportionality in criminal law, as the 20-month sentence is disproportionate to the unproven harm.

  4. Use of Electronic Evidence

    • Legal Standard: Article 55 of the CPL requires that electronic evidence (e.g., retweets) be verified for authenticity, relevance, and legality of collection. The Two Highs Interpretation also implies that online activity must be directly attributable to the defendant.

    • Application to the Retweet: The authorities likely obtained Chen’s retweet through digital forensics (e.g., cached data from his device or X account), presenting it as evidence of his act of dissemination. They would argue that the retweet, timestamped and linked to Chen’s account, satisfies the evidentiary requirement of proving the act.

    • Potential Issue: The case documents do not specify how the retweet was collected or verified. If the authorities failed to follow legal procedures (e.g., obtaining a proper search warrant) or did not verify the data’s authenticity (e.g., ensuring it was not tampered with), the evidence could be inadmissible under Criminal Procedure Law Article 50 (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence). Additionally, the relevance of a single retweet is questionable if its specific impact on public order was not proven.

Broader Context: Political Sensitivity and Selective Enforcement

  • Political Sensitivity: The post addresses “自干五” and “五毛,” directly mocking the CCP’s online propaganda strategies, a highly sensitive topic in China where the government tightly controls public discourse. The Kunming authorities likely viewed Chen’s retweet as a challenge to state authority, particularly because it questions the legitimacy of the CCP’s public opinion management. Article 293 is often used as a “pocket crime” to suppress politically sensitive speech, and its application to this retweet aligns with that pattern.

  • Selective Enforcement: Chen’s appeal and prison letter note that the original poster, “LT 視界,” and other retweeters were not prosecuted, indicating selective enforcement. This violates Criminal Law Article 4 (equality before the law) and suggests the authorities may have targeted Chen due to his academic background (PhD) to “make an example” and deter similar behavior.

Conclusion

The Kunming authorities’ use of Chen Jingyuan’s retweet of the “LT 視界” post as evidence for PXQT is based on the following legal reasoning:

  1. Content as “False Information”: The authorities likely deemed the post “false” for mocking CCP propaganda, but this classification lacks factual basis and conflates satire with falsehood.

  2. Subjective Intent: They inferred Chen’s “knowing” intent based on his education, but lacked direct evidence, violating evidentiary rules.

  3. Serious Disruption of Public Order: They claimed the retweet could cause social unrest, but provided no evidence of actual harm, and the retweet’s reach fell far below the quantitative thresholds.

  4. Electronic Evidence: The retweet was used as proof of dissemination, but its collection and relevance are questionable.

Legal Flaws:

  • The post’s content is political satire, not “false information” under the legal definition.

  • The inference of subjective intent lacks evidence, violating the presumption of innocence.

  • No “serious disruption” was proven, relying instead on presumed harm, exceeding legal standards.

  • Selective enforcement and political motivations suggest this case may be an abuse of law to suppress dissent rather than a strict application of legal principles.

This case highlights the overly broad application of Article 293 in politically sensitive cases, underscoring the need for clearer legal definitions and stricter evidentiary standards in online speech cases to prevent legal abuse.

Key Legal References

  • Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 4, 14, 293

  • Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 12, 50, 53, 55

  • Two Highs Interpretation (2013), Articles 2, 5(2)

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on the provided information and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult a professional lawyer for specific legal guidance. Grok Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.

Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don’t share information that can identify you.

[Chinese]