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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Core Ideas in the School of Names (Mingjia) from the Hundred Schools of Thought

The School of Names (Mingjia), a minor yet provocative Warring States philosophy (c. 475-221 BCE), is exemplified by Hui Shi and Gongsun Long, who dissected the relationship between names (ming) and actualities (shi) through linguistic paradoxes and relativism. Core ideas include the arbitrary separation of attributes (“hardness and whiteness are separate,” Gongsun Long), the compound nature of terms (“a white horse is not a horse,” distinguishing composite from simple), and Hui Shi’s ten paradoxes emphasizing perspectival relativity (“I know the Dao of heaven and earth, but not the Dao of a hair or fly”). Mingjia challenged rigid categorizations, highlighting language’s conventionality and the fluidity between form and substance, often through sophistic play to expose logical absurdities. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through the Mingjia lens, exemplifies the perils of unexamined naming: the judiciary’s compound “disruption” conflates attributes arbitrarily, severing names from actualities and fostering relativistic absurdities that undermine justice.

1. The Separation of Attributes: Judicial Conflation of “Intent” and “Act” as Arbitrary Naming

Gongsun Long’s “separation of hardness and whiteness” argues that attributes are distinct—white is not hardness; conflating them distorts reality, as in his paradox that “a white horse is not a horse” (compound specificity vs. simple generality).

The verdict commits this error: “knowingly false disruption” conflates the attribute “forwarding” (act) with “malicious intent” (white/hardness), arbitrarily naming Chen’s scholarly shares (e.g., Hayek critiques) as a compound “quarrel” without separating evidence from presumption (“high education implies discernment”). This naming absurdity—evidentiary voids (unverified posts, no causal chaos)—mirrors Gongsun Long’s logic: the judiciary’s “white horse” (intentional rumor) is not the simple “horse” (innocent inquiry), yet enforced as one. Mingjia would decry this as sophistic folly: unseparated attributes breed injustice, as the closed-door trial’s opacity further muddles distinctions, turning law into paradoxical wordplay detached from actuality.

2. Relativism and Perspectival Paradoxes: Selective Enforcement as Hui Shi’s Infinite Dao

Hui Shi’s paradoxes, like “the Dao of heaven and earth is known, but not that of a hair,” underscore relativism: all knowledge is partial, perspectives infinite, challenging absolute truths.

The selective enforcement embodies this: millions forward similar content unpunished, yet Chen’s case relativizes “disorder” from one perspective (state “order”) while ignoring others (scholarly dialogue). The prosecutor’s unverified admission highlights the paradox—“evidence” as infinite hair unknowable—yet the non-oral appeal absolutizes it, flouting Hui Shi’s call for humble relativity. Mingjia sophistry shines here: the “evidence chain” is a perspectival illusion, like “motion is stillness from afar,” where low-impact forwards (<100 retweets) “move” no chaos, yet are named disruptive. This infinite play exposes judicial hubris: without relativistic humility, law devolves into self-contradictory naming, breeding the very quarrels it prohibits.

3. Linguistic Conventionality and Logical Play: The “Pockets” of Article 293 as Arbitrary Word Games

Mingjia’s core is language’s conventionality—names arbitrary, logic playful—using paradoxes to probe reality’s fluidity, as in Gongsun Long’s “pointless square” challenging fixed categories.

Article 293’s “picking quarrels” is such a conventional game: a “pocket” term arbitrarily encompassing diverse acts, from Chen’s inquiry to undefined “disruption,” without logical precision. The prison letter’s taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) playfully dissects this—naming “rumor” as fluid category—yet the “shut up” directive halts the game, enforcing arbitrary fixity. Mingjia would revel in this absurdity: the judiciary’s wordplay, like “orphan without a mother,” orphans justice from logic, turning law into sophistic trap. The anomalies (zero ripple) underscore conventionality’s farce—naming cannot cage the unnamed Dao of discourse.

Conclusion: The Mingjia Lens on the Case—Paradoxical Naming in a Game of Absurdity

From the School of Names’ linguistic relativism, the Chen Jingyuan case is a sophistic farce: conflated attributes breed illusion, perspectival paradoxes expose hubris, and arbitrary conventions trap justice in wordplay. As of October 22, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its silence a masterful unnamed retort. This case cautions: unexamined names unravel reality. As Gongsun Long quipped, “A white horse is not a horse”—may the judiciary heed the game, lest quarrels name themselves.