Copilot
核心结论 | Core Conclusion
中文：以G. E. Moore的常识唯实论评析，陈京元博士一案暴露出把常识性判断与普通语际事实挪作非常断定、以抽象法律标签替代可观测事实证据的倾向；在证据不足或解释过度时，应回到“普通常识”的判断标准，保护常态人际语际交往与日常判断的可信性。
English: From G. E. Moore’s commonsense realism, this case reveals a tendency to convert ordinary common-sense judgments and empirical linguistic facts into extraordinary legal determinations, substituting abstract legal labels for observable evidential chains; where evidence is thin or interpretation overreaches, one should revert to ordinary common-sense standards to preserve the credibility of everyday interpersonal and linguistic judgments.
📘 摩尔哲学要点（简明） | Moore’s Key Ideas (Brief)
中文：摩尔强调常识判断的首要地位，反对把哲学怀疑主义或抽象推论强加到日常信念之上；在伦理上他提出“自然主义谬误”警示把“好”还原为自然属性不可行。
English: Moore defends the primacy of common-sense judgments against philosophical skepticism or abstract reduction; in ethics he warns (via the naturalistic fallacy) against collapsing evaluative claims into mere natural descriptions.
逐点评析 | Point‑by‑Point Evaluation
以常识为证据标准 | Common Sense as Evidential Baseline
中文：摩尔会要求先确立那些最基本、可直接把握的事实——如“某人确为转发者”“转发是否造成可观测实害”“是否存在明确证据显示其主观恶意”——再决定是否适用刑罚。若这些事实以常识性观察难以成立，则不应以高度抽象的法律定性取代事实判断。
English: Moore would demand establishing basic, directly graspable facts first—e.g., that the person indeed reposted, whether the repost caused observable harm, and whether there is clear evidence of subjective malice—before applying criminal sanctions. If such facts do not hold up under commonsense observation, abstract legal labeling should not replace factual judgment.
反对以怀疑主义或理论化推翻日常判断 | Resist Replacing Ordinary Judgments with Philosophical Doubt
中文：当权力声称“某种言论必然构成扰乱”时，摩尔式的反驳是：不要用高度理论化的怀疑或普遍假设去推翻日常可证的判断；若普通人、独立观察者在常识上不会将行为视为犯罪，则司法应提供更强的证据来推翻这一常识。
English: When authority claims “this kind of speech necessarily constitutes disturbance,” a Moorean rebuttal is: do not use highly theoretical skepticism or sweeping assumptions to overturn everyday verifications; if ordinary people or independent observers would not, in common sense, regard the act as criminal, the judiciary must offer stronger evidence to rebut that commonsense.
区分描述性事实与评价性结论 | Distinguish Descriptive Facts from Evaluative Conclusions
中文：摩尔警示我们不要把语言上的评价性结论（例如“扰乱”“造谣”“明知”）直接当作描述事实的等价物。法律裁判需先通过可观测事证建立描述性事实链，再谨慎作出评价性归责。
English: Moore cautions against treating evaluative labels (e.g., “disruptive,” “false rumor,” “knew better”) as equivalent to descriptive facts. Legal adjudication should first establish a descriptive evidential chain through observation, then cautiously render evaluative attributions.
维护日常判断的证信功能 | Protect the Epistemic Role of Ordinary Judgment
中文：摩尔强调普通常识在知识体系中的基石作用。司法若随意推翻或边缘化常识判断，社会基本信认机制被削弱，公共话语与信任亦会受损。对言论与学术表达的处理尤其应谨慎，以免破坏社会的基本认知秩序。
English: Moore emphasizes the foundational epistemic role of ordinary common sense. If courts casually overturn or marginalize commonsense judgments, basic mechanisms of social recognition are weakened and public trust erodes. Handling of speech and academic expression deserves special caution lest the basic epistemic order be damaged.
对司法实践的建议（摩尔式） | Moorean Recommendations for Practice
中文：在定罪前优先呈示并评估那些日常可验证的事实证据，不以身份、假设性推论或抽象法律标签代替直接证据；在证据不足时，应倾向于维持常识性无罪判断；审判过程应保护辩护机会与透明审查，以避免以理论化判断取代常识性检验。
English: Prioritize presenting and assessing ordinary verifiable facts before conviction; do not substitute identity, hypothetical inferences, or abstract legal labels for direct evidence; where evidence is insufficient, err on the side of preserving commonsense non‑culpability; safeguard defense rights and transparent scrutiny so that theoretical judgment does not supplant commonsense appraisal.
结语 | Closing
中文：按摩尔的常识唯实论，法律判断若要正当，必须基于那些可被普通理智把握的事实与常识性判断；在面临复杂语际与制度性话语时，更需谨慎区分事实与评价，保护日常判断的证信地位与公共信任。
English: According to Moorean commonsense realism, legal legitimacy requires grounding in facts and common‑sense judgments accessible to ordinary rational appraisal; when confronted with complex linguistic and institutional discourse, care must be taken to separate facts from evaluations and to protect the evidential status of ordinary judgment and public trust.