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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Robert Alexy’s Legal Philosophy Core Ideas

Robert Alexy (1945-), a leading figure in contemporary legal philosophy, develops a discourse-theoretic approach to law in A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1978) and A Theory of Constitutional Rights (1985). His core ideas distinguish rules (all-or-nothing application) from principles (optimization requirements weighed in conflicts via proportionality tests); legal validity derives from moral correctness through rational discourse, where argumentation in the “ideal speech situation” ensures legitimacy; and constitutional rights as principles demand balancing substantive rights against collective goods. Alexy’s framework integrates Habermas’s discourse ethics, emphasizing law’s dual nature—positive validity and moral rightness—to foster democratic legitimacy. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Alexy’s lens, exemplifies a profound failure of legal discourse: the judiciary substitutes arbitrary rules for principled balancing, suppressing rational argumentation and eroding moral legitimacy, resulting in a crisis of constitutional proportionality and discursive justice.

1. Rules vs. Principles: The Misapplication of Categorical Rules Over Proportional Balancing

Alexy’s principles theory posits that constitutional rights are principles to be optimized, not absolute rules; conflicts require a proportionality test assessing suitability, necessity, and adequacy of means.

Article 293 functions here as a categorical rule—all-or-nothing “disruption”—devoid of principled weighing: Chen’s forwards (e.g., Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) are deemed “knowingly false” without balancing his freedom of expression (a constitutional principle under Article 35) against “social order.” The “high education implies discernment” presumption imposes a blanket rule, ignoring optimization—e.g., low impact (<100 retweets, no chaos)—failing the necessity prong (less restrictive alternatives like fact-checks were ignored). Alexy would critique this as discursive illegitimacy: the closed-door trial bypasses balancing, treating speech as disposable rule-violation rather than optimizable principle, eroding the moral rightness essential for legal validity. This rigid application commodifies rights, subordinating individual dignity to collective fiat.

2. Rational Discourse and the Ideal Speech Situation: Suppressed Argumentation Undermines Legitimacy

Alexy’s discourse theory of law requires argumentation in an “ideal speech situation”—free from coercion, equality of participants, and orientation toward correctness—to validate norms.

The proceedings shatter this ideal: the non-public first trial and non-oral appeal exclude equal participation, with the “shut up” directive silencing Chen’s rational claims (e.g., his prison letter’s rumor taxonomy and avalanche theory denying causal “disorder”). The prosecutor’s unverified admission (no post fact-checks) flouts correctness, yet dominates discourse, generating illegitimate norms. Alexy would see this as a validity crisis: without uncoerced argumentation, the verdict lacks moral grounding—selective enforcement (millions of similar forwards unpunished) implicates power asymmetry, violating equality. The result is discursive pathology: law devolves from rational consensus to authoritarian fiat, severing positive validity from moral rightness and undermining democratic legitimacy.

3. Constitutional Rights and Moral Correctness: The Erosion of Proportionality in Human Rights Protection

For Alexy, constitutional rights as principles demand moral correctness; their protection via balancing ensures substantive justice against formal legality.

The case perverts this: freedom of thought (Article 35) as a principle is outweighed by an uncalibrated “order” without adequacy test—e.g., the “evidence chain” fails suitability (no causal harm evidenced). This erodes moral correctness: the sentence commodifies inquiry as “quarrel,” ignoring rights’ optimization in a digital age. Alexy would diagnose a constitutional deficit: without principled discourse, rights become hollow formalisms, echoing his critique of positivism—law risks moral bankruptcy, where “justice” serves power over humanity.

Conclusion: Alexy’s Lens on the Case—A Discursive Deficit in Proportional Justice

From Robert Alexy’s discourse theory of law, the Chen Jingyuan case is a legitimacy abyss: rule-bound rigidity supplants principled balancing, coerced “discourse” mocks the ideal speech situation, and moral correctness yields to formal coercion, fracturing constitutional rights. As of October 21, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its silence a stark indictment of discursive failure. This case cautions: law without rational argumentation is tyranny in principle’s clothing. As Alexy affirms, true validity demands moral dialogue—here, a call for proportionality to restore justice’s ethical core.