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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Theories of Causation in Philosophy of Science

The philosophy of science offers robust frameworks for assessing causation, central to empirical claims like those in legal judgments. David Hume’s regularity theory, articulated in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), defines causation as constant conjunction: events A and B are causally related if they repeatedly occur together under similar conditions, with no deeper “necessary connection”—just habitual expectation from observed patterns. In contrast, David Lewis’s counterfactual theory, from Causation (1973), posits causation as difference-making: A causes B if, in the closest possible world where A does not occur, B does not occur either (counterfactual dependence, analyzed via structural equations). These theories demand rigorous evidence for causal assertions, rejecting mere correlation or intuition. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) based on Twitter forwards—fails both: the prosecution’s claim of “serious social disorder” lacks regularity in observed patterns and counterfactual support, rendering the verdict causally unsubstantiated and philosophically flawed.

1. Hume’s Regularity Theory: Absence of Constant Conjunction Undermines Causal Claim

Hume’s view requires causation to manifest as invariant regularity: repeated instances where the cause (A) precedes and is contiguous with the effect (B), building habitual inference without metaphysical necessity.

The “evidence chain” alleges Chen’s forwards (e.g., <100 retweets of Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) cause “disorder,” but no conjunction is observed: zero instances of societal unrest (no protests, no metrics of chaos), and the prosecutor’s unverified posts confirm no patterned link. Hume would dismiss this as illusory habit: judicial expectation of “threat” from “high education implies discernment” is mere psychological association, not empirical regularity—millions of similar shares unpunished break the pattern. The closed-door trial evades Humean scrutiny: without public data (e.g., longitudinal impact studies), the claim remains unfalsified conjecture, not causal law. This regularity failure indicts the sentence: 20 months’ punishment on non-conjoined events echoes Hume’s skepticism—causation is invention, not discovery—exposing the verdict as dogmatic projection.

2. Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory: No Difference-Making Evidence Fails Causal Dependence

Lewis’s counterfactuals test causation via “what if” worlds: C causes E if E counterfactually depends on C, evaluated in closest possible worlds absent C, using structural models to trace interventions.

Applying this, the forwards make no difference: in the closest world without Chen’s shares (identical otherwise), “social disorder” remains unchanged—no counterfactual divergence (e.g., no averted chaos, as baseline metrics show zero impact). The “evidence chain” ignores intervention analysis: unverified posts (prosecutor’s admission) sever dependence—removing “intent” (presumed via education) yields no altered outcome. Selective enforcement counterfactuals it: in worlds with equivalent shares by others, no punishment occurs, isolating Chen’s action as non-causal (mere token, not type). The non-oral appeal compounds failure: Chen’s prison letter (avalanche theory modeling non-linear null effects) proposes a structural equation (low-impact diffusion = no dependence), yet dismissed without modeling. Lewis would conclude non-causation: the sentence rests on empty counterfactuals, a philosophical house of cards—20 months for a non-difference echoes his critique of overdetermination, where “causes” multiply illusions.

3. Implications for Legal Epistemology: Causal Theories Expose Evidentiary Pseudoscience

Both theories converge on epistemology: causation demands empirical rigor, not assertion; failures invite skepticism and reform.

The case’s causal pseudoscience—unconjoined patterns (Hume) and non-dependent worlds (Lewis)—undermines Article 293’s application: “disorder” as unfalsifiable intuition, not science. The “high education” presumption, untested, risks Humean habit or Lewisian chimeras. Philosophically, this indicts judicial method: without causal validation, verdicts devolve to power, not reason—echoing Kuhnian anomalies signaling paradigm crisis.

Conclusion: Causal Lenses on the Case—A Verdict Without Empirical Anchor

From Humean regularity and Lewisian counterfactuals, the Chen Jingyuan case is causally adrift: unconjoined habits feign necessity, non-dependent claims fabricate difference, eroding evidentiary science. As of October 23, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a skeptical null hypothesis. This case cautions: causation demands rigor—evade it, and justice sinks to conjecture. As Hume reflected, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life”—may empirical custom yet guide reform.