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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on John Austin’s Core Ideas in Analytical Jurisprudence

John Austin (1790-1859), the founder of analytical jurisprudence, developed a positivist framework in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), distinguishing positive law—what law is—from moral or normative law—what law ought to be. His core ideas posit law as sovereign commands backed by sanctions: the sovereign is the person or body habitually obeyed, issuing general orders to subjects under threat of punishment; law is a system of such commands, independent of morality, with validity deriving from sovereign recognition rather than ethical merit. Austin’s descriptive approach emphasizes clarity in legal concepts, rejecting natural law confusions. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Austin’s lens, exemplifies sovereign command in action, yet reveals tensions in its application: the judiciary enforces a command-like rule as positive law, but selective execution and evidentiary voids question habitual obedience and sanction proportionality, bordering on arbitrary positivity.

1. Law as Sovereign Command: The Verdict as a General Order Backed by Sanctions

Austin defines law proper as a sovereign’s command—a general directive to subjects, enforced by sanctions—distinguishing it from mere habits or moral precepts.

Article 293 functions here as a sovereign command: the state’s general order prohibits “disruptive” online acts, with imprisonment as sanction, habitually obeyed through institutional machinery. The sentence treats Chen’s forwards (e.g., Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon) as violations of this command, issuing a specific order via the “evidence chain”—a positivity detached from moral “ought” (e.g., no weighing of free inquiry). Austin would affirm this as valid positive law: the judiciary, as sovereign delegate, commands obedience, with the closed-door trial ensuring enforcement. However, anomalies like unverified posts (prosecutor’s admission) and zero causal “disorder” implicate command frailty—the sanction lacks the habitual clarity Austin demands, risking perception as capricious rather than general.

2. Sovereign Habitual Obedience and Positive Law’s Independence from Morality

For Austin, sovereignty rests on habitual obedience: the sovereign commands without superior threat; positive law’s validity is formal, not ethical—utility or justice is secondary.

The PRC state’s habitual sovereignty is evident: millions comply with online norms, rendering Article 293’s command effective. The verdict positively applies law—Chen’s “high education implies discernment” as a formal inference—independent of morality (e.g., ignoring expressive rights under Article 35). Austin would endorse this separation: the non-oral appeal and “shut up” directive enforce positivity without moral dilution. Yet selective enforcement (similar forwards unpunished) strains habitual obedience: if commands apply arbitrarily, sovereignty wavers, echoing Austin’s caveat that perceived injustice erodes compliance. The prison letter’s unheeded taxonomy (art/emotion/reason/fact) highlights this—positive law risks moral bleed, undermining its formal purity.

3. Descriptive Clarity vs. Normative Intrusion: The Case’s Conceptual Confusions in Legal Positivity

Austin’s analytical method demands descriptive precision: clarify “law is” to avoid normative “ought,” dissecting commands into duty-imposing elements.

The judgment confuses description: “picking quarrels” descriptively commands against “disruption,” but normatively intrudes “intent” without clear duty (e.g., no quantified threshold for “rumors”). The “evidence chain” descriptively lists forwards, yet normatively infers malice sans sanction proportionality. Austin would critique this as conceptual muddle: the prosecutor’s unverified admission blurs positivity, inviting normative critique (unjust “ought”). The barred defense exacerbates confusion—descriptive clarity requires hearing Chen’s taxonomy, lest law devolve into vague imperative. This risks Austin’s own warning: unanalyzed positivity invites natural law rebellion, eroding sovereign command.

Conclusion: Austin’s Lens on the Case—A Positivist Command Teetering on Arbitrariness

From John Austin’s analytical jurisprudence, the Chen Jingyuan case is a positivist archetype: sovereign commands enforce positive law with sanctions, descriptively independent of morality—yet evidentiary voids and selectivity implicate habitual obedience’s fragility, blurring description into normative haze. As of October 21, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its silence a quiet challenge to command’s clarity. This case cautions: positivity thrives on precise analysis—without it, sovereign orders risk the very arbitrariness Austin sought to dispel.