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An Evaluation of the Chen Jingyuan Case Based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Core Ideas

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), one of the 20th century’s most influential philosophers, shifted from the picture theory of language in his early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) to a later emphasis on “language games” in Philosophical Investigations (1953), where meaning arises from use within “forms of life”—embedded social practices. Words are not fixed representations of reality but tools in rule-following activities, susceptible to misinterpretation if abstracted from context; philosophical problems stem from bewitchment by language, resolved by clarifying “grammar” through examples, not theory. The Chen Jingyuan case—a doctoral scholar sentenced to 20 months for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (PRC Criminal Law Article 293) over Twitter forwards—through Wittgenstein’s lens, exemplifies linguistic bewitchment: the judiciary abstracts “disruption” from its form of life, distorting language games of inquiry into coercive rules, leading to a crisis of meaning and social practice.

1. Language Games and Rule-Following Misapplication: Judicial Abstraction as Bewitchment

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy views language as a “game” of rule-following within forms of life: meaning is not inherent but derived from shared practices, where missteps arise from treating words as rigid pictures detached from use.

The verdict bewitches through abstraction: “knowingly false rumors” treats “disruption” as a fixed rule, detached from Chen’s scholarly game—forwarding Hayek critiques or the “Trump-kneeling Xi” cartoon as moves in the inquiry practice, not “provocation.” The “high education implies discernment” presumption imposes a private language game, ignoring communal rules (e.g., millions of similar forwards unpunished). Wittgenstein would diagnose this as grammatical confusion: the court’s “evidence chain” pictures “intent” as an isolable entity, bewitching participants into a solitary game where Chen’s prison letter (categorizing “rumors” into art/emotion/reason/fact) is dismissed as “irrelevant,” severing it from the shared form of life. This misapplication fractures the game: justice devolves from cooperative rule-following to authoritarian dictation, echoing Wittgenstein’s warning against “idling” concepts— “order” idles as empty picture, not lived practice.

2. Forms of Life and the Erosion of Shared Practices: Suppressed Inquiry as Social Dislocation

Forms of life are the bedrock of meaning: language games embed in cultural practices, and philosophical clarity restores their “natural” flow by examining ordinary use.

The closed-door trial and “shut up” directive dislocate Chen’s form of life: his scholarly practice—rhythmic forwards as dialogic moves in intellectual exchange—is uprooted, re-embedded in the judiciary’s alien game of “disorder.” Anomalies like unverified posts or zero societal impact expose the erosion: the prosecutor’s admission flouts the shared practice of evidence (no fact-checks), yet the non-oral appeal enforces a sterile form, suppressing Chen’s avalanche theory as “nonsense.” Wittgenstein would see this as a crisis of ordinary language: the case bewitches by privatizing rules— “picking quarrels” becomes a game without players, detached from the form of academic life (e.g., global discourse on censored topics). This dislocation fragments social practices: inquiry, once communal, turns adversarial, risking the “cracks” Wittgenstein feared—language loses its grip on life, justice a hollow ritual.

3. Philosophical Therapy and the Limits of Language: The Case as Bewitched Inquiry Demanding Clarification

Wittgenstein’s therapy dissolves problems by clarifying grammar: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use,” revealing pseudo-problems in misapplied language.

The trial’s pseudo-problem—“disruption from rumors”—demands therapy: clarifying “intent” in Chen’s forwards (e.g., candlelight memorials as emotional practice) shows no metaphysical “malice,” just everyday use in a digital form of life. The “evidence chain” bewitches with pseudo-logic, treating scattered posts as atomic threats without grammatical ties (no causal “disorder”). Chen’s letter therapeutically clarifies—avalanche theory returns “chaos” to everyday network use—yet suppression (barred defense) perpetuates the bewitchment. Wittgenstein would prescribe dissolution: the case’s “grammar” error—abstracting “quarrels” from practice—resolves via examples, not fiat; without it, philosophy (and law) idles in illusion, echoing his Tractatus limit: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”—here, silence imposed, not chosen.

Conclusion: Wittgenstein’s Lens on the Case—A Bewitched Game of Distorted Practices

From Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the Chen Jingyuan case is a bewitchment by language: abstracted rules fracture games, dislocate forms of life, and evade therapeutic clarity, turning justice into a solitary illusion. As of October 21, 2025, no retrial or exoneration has occurred; Chen’s account remains dormant, its quiet a stark reminder of silenced practices. This case cautions: philosophy liberates by returning to use—urging a judiciary where language games flow cooperatively, not coercively. As Wittgenstein concluded, “The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to”—here, a call to end the bewitchment.