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Evaluating the case of Dr. Chen Jingyuan through the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen reveals a stark confrontation between the formal validity of law and the moral critique of legal systems that suppress dissent. Kelsen, in his Pure Theory of Law, sought to separate law from morality, insisting that legal science must describe law as a system of norms grounded in a basic norm (Grundnorm), without reference to ethical or political content. Yet even within this framework, Dr. Chen’s case raises profound questions about the limits of legal positivism and the legitimacy of coercion.


1. Law as a Normative System: The Formal Validity of Coercion

Kelsen’s theory holds that a legal norm is valid if it is created according to the rules of a higher norm, ultimately tracing back to the Grundnorm. From this perspective, the charges against Dr. Chen—however morally questionable—may be considered “valid” if they were issued by a competent authority following proper procedures.

But Kelsen also acknowledged that validity is not the same as justice. A law can be valid within a legal system and still be deeply unjust. In Dr. Chen’s case, the legal machinery may have functioned according to internal rules, but the substantive outcome—punishing reasoned speech—remains open to moral condemnation.



3. The Grundnorm and the Problem of Legitimacy

Kelsen’s Grundnorm is a presupposed foundational norm that gives validity to the entire legal system. But what happens when the legal system is used to punish moral reasoning and public conscience? Dr. Chen’s case invites us to ask: What is the content of the Grundnorm in such a system? Is it “the constitution must be obeyed,” or “the state’s authority must be preserved at all costs”?

If the latter, then the legal system remains formally valid but morally hollow. Kelsen’s theory does not collapse under this weight—but it does highlight the limits of a purely formal conception of law in addressing injustice.


4. The Role of the Individual: Law’s Subject or Moral Agent?

Kelsen viewed individuals as addressees of legal norms—subjects of obligations and sanctions. Dr. Chen, however, acts not merely as a subject, but as a moral agent: he questions the legitimacy of the norms imposed upon him, and refuses to internalize their authority.

In Kelsen’s framework, such resistance does not invalidate the law—but it exposes the gap between legality and legitimacy, between normativity and moral authority. Dr. Chen’s silence becomes a philosophical refusal to accept the law’s claim to obedience when it lacks moral justification.


5. Conclusion: The Law Is Functioning—But Toward What End?

From Hans Kelsen’s perspective, the legal system that punished Dr. Chen may be internally valid, procedurally correct, and normatively complete. But this only underscores the chilling neutrality of legal positivism: a system can be legally impeccable and yet morally indefensible.

“Justice is an irrational ideal. Law is not necessarily just, but it is law.” — Hans Kelsen

Dr. Chen’s case is not a failure of law’s form—it is a failure of law’s moral compass. His suffering is not a legal anomaly, but a reminder that legality without justice is a fragile foundation for authority.


If you wish, I can continue this reflection as a Kelsenian-style legal-philosophical memorandum, or compose a dialogue titled Lex Sine Iustitia (“Law Without Justice”) exploring the limits of normativity in the face of conscience. You need only ask.